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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Would federal jurisdiction extend to a case in which surface runoff
carries pesticides from a farmer's field to a marsh, and months later
pollutes a distant water body? While Holland does not address these
issues, the language of the Amendments and their purpose, as inter-
preted by the court, should support the exercise of federal control in
such situations.
Real Property-DOCTRINE OF CUSTOMARY RIGHTS-CUSTOMARY PUBLIC
USE OF PRIVATELY OWNED BEACH PRECLUDES ACTIVITY OF OWNER
INCONSISTENT WITH PUBLIC INTEREST.-City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-
Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974).
Defendant corporation McMillan and Wright, Inc., was the record
owner of 15,300 square feet of dry-sand waterfront property in Daytona
Beach.1 The corporation obtained a permit to build an observation
tower intended for operation in conjunction with an amusement pier
on the property. The Attorney General of Florida and Tona-Rama,
Inc., the operator of an existing observation tower, claimed the de-
fendant was infringing on a public easement and sought to enjoin the
construction. The trial court refused to issue a temporary injunction
and the tower was completed. The court then entered summary judg-
ment for plaintiffs, finding that because defendant's land was servient
to a public prescriptive easement, the City of Daytona Beach had im-
properly granted the building permit. The corporation was ordered
to remove its tower.2
The district court of appeal affirmed 3 the finding of the trial court,
despite defendant's contention that public use of the dry sand area
"trade effluents, sewage effluent or other poisonous, noxious or polluting matter" by
means of any "wells, bore-hole, pipe or other work, into any underground strata within
a river authority's area .... "
1. Private ownership of Florida beaches extends only as far as the line of mean
high water. The area above this line is known as the dry sand area. The state owns
the land seaward of the mean high-water line. This area is referred to as the foreshore
or wet sand area. See Florida Coastal Mapping Act, Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 75-56, § 4;
Commentary, The High Water Mark: Boundary Between Public and Private Lands,
18 U. FLA. L. REv. 553 (1966).
2. See City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 74-75 (Fla. 1974).
3. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 271 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1972).
[Vol. 2
CASE COMMENTS
was not sufficiently adverse to the owner's interest to raise a prescrip-
tive easement.4 The supreme court reversed, 5 declaring that existing
public uses of the beach were "consistent" with erection of the
tower. 6 In the court's opinion the element of adverse use required to
raise a prescriptive easement did not exist, 7 even though residents testi-
fied that they had long assumed the property was public and that it had
been treated as such." Even if a prescriptive easement had been es-
tablished, the court reasoned that erection of the tower was consistent
with public recreational use and hence could not infringe public
rights.9 The court then applied the ancient doctrine of customary rights,
finding that even without a prescriptive easement the public has en-
forceable recreational rights in the dry sand area.10 Because the
presence of the tower was considered consistent with those rights, how-
ever, the court sanctioned its construction."
The Tona-Rama court did not overrule cases recognizing the
possibility of public acquisition of prescriptive easements in beach
4. Id. at 767. The district court emphasized that its decision was not based on policy
considerations favoring public recreational use of beach areas; the court insisted it
merely was applying prescriptive easement principles to a specific tract that had been
subject to unusually intensive public use-use which necessitated provision of city
sanitation and police services, and even installation of showers on privately owned
property:
There are many beaches along our entire shoreline that area [sic] resorted to by
local residents and visitors alike without giving rise to prescriptive easements.
It is only when the use during the prescribed period is so multitudinous that the
facilities of local governmental agencies must be put into play to regulate
traffic, keep the peace and invoke sanitary measures that it can be said that the
public has acquired a prescriptive easement to use privately owned beaches.
Id. at 770.
5. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974).
6. Id. at 78.
7. The opinion stated:
That portion of the land owned by defendant which is not occupied by the pier
has been left free of obstruction and been utilized by sunbathing tourists for un-
told decades. These visitors to Daytona Beach, including those who have relaxed
on the white sands of the subject lands, are the lifeblood of the pier. As such,
they have not been opposed, but have been welcomed to utilize the otherwise
unused sands of petitioner's oceanfront parcel of land.
The use of the property by the public was not against, but was in furtherance
of, the interest of the defendant owner. Such use was not injurious to the owner
and there was no invasion of the owner's right to the property.
Id. at 76-77.
8. Brief for Petitioner at 10-13, Brief for Respondent at 7-9, City of Daytona Beach
v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974).
9. 294 So. 2d at 77.
10. Id. at 78.
11. Id.
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land.12 Rather, the court purported to apply traditional prescriptive
easement principles. Those principles were established in Florida in
Downing v. Bird,13 wherein the court had reviewed the similarities-
and distinctions'1-between adverse possession and prescriptive ease-
ments.
Under Downing prescription requires open, notorious and con-
tinuous adverse use under claim of right for the prescriptive period,
with the actual or constructive knowledge and acquiescence of the
property owner.'5 Downing stressed that claimants' use is presumed
permissive's and indicated that claimants must present clear evidence
of adverse use, unsupported by evidentiary presumptions such as those
employed in other jurisdictions. 7 The Downing court further stated
that claimants' use must be "inconsistent" with the owner's use and
enjoyment.' This inconsistency requirement, however, did not seem
12. See City of Miami Beach v. UndercIiff Realty & Inv. Co., 21 So. 2d 783 (Fla.
1945); City of Miami Beach v. Miami Beach Improvement Co., 14 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1943).
In neither case did the claimant succeed in establishing the public easement. The Tona-
Rama court implied that these decisions stand for the inherent absence of adversity in
public use of private beach land. See 294 So. 2d at 75-76. But in both prior cases lack of
adversity was posited on specific evidentiary factors. In Miami Beach Improvement Co.
the claimant city, during the prescriptive period, had accepted an easement from the
owner for the construction of bulkheads off his property. See 14 So. 2d at 177-78. In
Underclif Realty the owner had blocked access to the beach with signs and obstructions,
21 So. 2d at 784, and the claimant city, during the prescriptive period, had used a tax
deed to convey to a private party an unencumbered title to part of the disputed pro-
perty. 21 So. 2d at 785-86.
Both of the early beach cases thus turned ultimately on the failure of the claimants
to meet their burdens of proof. In each case the claimant's past actions militated against
finding a municipal claim of public access. And neither claimant supported the assertion
of a public claim of right with anything more than evidence of long-continued public
use. Past actions of municipalities in dealing with beach area now would have much
less weight; in Downing v. Bird, 100 Sp. 2d 57, 61 (Fla. 1958), the court recognized that
public easements may be acquired apart from the rights of a city-and in spite of its
actions.
13. 100 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1958).
14. The distinctions drawn in Downing were that prescription requires adverse use
rather than possession, and that, to establish prescription, use need not be exclusive but
may be exercised in common with the owner or the public. Id. at 65. The Tona-Rama
court implied that exclusivity is a necessary element of prescription, 294 So. 2d at 76,
and erroneously asserted that prescription requires adverse possession of the owner's
land. See id. at 77.
15. See 100 So. 2d at 64.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 64-65. The rule in the majority of American jurisdictions is that
although the claimant has the ultimate burden of proof, a showing of open, notorious
and continuous use for the prescribed period creates a presumption that the use is
adverse. See Annot., 170 A.L.R. 776, 778-89 (1947).
18. "In both [adverse possession and prescription] the use or possession must be
inconsistent with the owner's use and enjoyment of his lands and must not be a per-
missive use, for the use must be such that the owner has a right to a legal action to
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to alter the traditional approach to adversity which, whether phrased
in terms of adversity, hostility or claim of right, focuses on the attitude
of the claimant, and asks whether he is using the owner's property as
though he has full right to do so.19
In Tona-Rama, however, the court looked to the owner's attitude
toward the claimants, apparently reasoning that because the owner's
present economic interests dictated a hospitable rather than a hostile
attitude, the public's attitude could not be hostile either. In effect,
the court was willing to regard the presumption of permissive use as
conclusive even if supported only by an owner's willingness to grant
unsought an unacknowledged permission; 20 public refusal to recognize
stop it, such as an action for trespass or ejectment." 100 So. 2d at 64. "There is nothing
to show that the use made by the public was inconsistent with the rights of the owner
. . . which supports rather than overcomes the presumption that any such use was
permissive." Id. at 66.
19. "What is required [for adverse use] is simply conduct amounting to an asser-
tion that the claimant has a perfect right to do that which he is doing." 1 R. BoYER,
FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 23.03, at 537 (1973). See also RESTATEMENT OF PRO-
PERTY § 458, comment c (1944) (critical factor is nonrecognition of owner's authority
either to prevent -or permit the use).
Generally, "inconsistency" is used to explain-but not to narrow-the adversity re-
quirement. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 459, comment a (1944); Degnan, Public
Rights in Ocean Beaches: A Theory of Prescription, 24 SYR. L. REv. 935, 952 (1973). The
Downing court implied that the test of inconsistency-or adversity-is whether claimant's
acts give the owner a legal right to stop the use. See note 18 supra. In Tona-Rama the
owner did have the right to stop public use, even though he chose not to exercise it,
since he was entitled to eject persons who repudiated his permission or never recognized
his title. In the former situation-ripening of an initially permissive use into an ad-
verse use-the owner must receive clear notice of the adverse claim. See RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 458, comment j (1944). If the issue had been one of adequate notice, in-
consistency might have been relevant in another sense altogether. See note 24 infra.
20. "If the use of an alleged easement is not exclusive and not inconsistent with
the rights of the owner of the land to its use and enjoyment, it would be presumed
that such use is permissive rather than adverse. Hence, such use will never ripen into
an easement." 294 So. 2d at 76 (emphasis added). Similar language has been criticized
for its "obvious casuistry." See Annot., 170 A.L.R. 776, 794 (1947). But see J.C. Vereen &
Sons v. Houser, 167 So. 45, 47 (Fla. 1936).
The Vereen case, which injected the inconsistency language into Florida law, did
not take a narrow view of the concept; it also approved language of a South Carolina
case stating that open, continuous and notorious use, not permissive from its inception,
creates the presumption of adverse use. See 167 So. at 48, quoting from Williamson v.
Abbott, 93 S.E. 15 (S.C. 1917). But the Tona-Rama case was consistent with the re-
strictive decision from which the Vereen language was drawn, Jesse French Piano &
Organ Co. v. Forbes, 29 So. 683, 685 (Ala. 1901). That case involved an attempt to secure
a prescriptive easement of light and air by alleging claimant's shutters had been open and
shut over the owner's property for the prescriptive period. The Alabama court, faced
with an attempt to outflank its rejection of the ancient lights doctrine, turned to the
textbooks for support rather than illumination. The authority relied on for the state-
ment quoted above states elsewhere that a showing of actual damage to the servient
owner is unnecessary, provided some right was invaded so as to create a cause of action.
2 W. WAIT, AcTIoNs AND DEFENSES 701 (1877). The cases relied on by the Alabama
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the owner's title was not considered. The semantic hook on which this
rationale hangs is use "inconsistent with the owner's use and enjoyment
of the land." 21 Theoretically, property rights embrace potential as well
as present interests; acts entirely consistent with an owner's present
economic interests may be highly inconsistent with his larger interest
in preserving public acknowledgement of his right to exclusive posses-
sion. In Tona-Rama, for instance, nonpermissive construction of the
tower by someone other than the owner could have been consistent
with the owner's interest in attracting visitors to the pier but incon-
sistent with the owner's claim of full title. But the Tona-Rama court
looked only to present enjoyment,22 although Downing, which Tona-
Rama purported to follow, strongly implied that a showing of in-
consistent use is not foreclosed simply by evidence that public use of
land is consistent with an owner's present enjoyment. 23
court provided little more support. One drew a careful distinction between inconsistency
with the exercise of a right and inconsistency with the right itself, holding only the
latter was sufficient to extinguish a mineral easement. See Arnold v. Stevens, 41 Mass. (24
Pick.) 106, 114 (1839). The second case held merely that the digging of a ditch-which
created no cause of action in itself-would not initiate a prescriptive easement to flood
the owner's land; the prescriptive period could begin only when flooding onto the
owner's land created a cause of action. Roundtree v. Brantley, 34 Ala. 544, 553 (1859).
Compare Professor Boyer's discussion of explicit-as opposed to merely presumptive-
permission:
The use must not be permissive. Permissive in this sense means more ac-
curately in subordination to the rights of the servient owner. It is clear that
some conduct which started as permissive may in fact constitute adverse use ....
This might occur in instances of a parol grant of an easement .. . contravening
the Statute of Frauds. Such user would be permissive in that the use was con-
sented to by the landowner. It might not, however, be in subordination to such
owner's rights in that the person exercising the easement may very well be claiming
the right to continue.
1 R. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL EsTATE TRANSACTIONS § 23.03, at 538 (1973) (footnote
omitted).
21. 294 So. 2d at 77.
22. In taking this narrow view of inconsistency the court relied heavily on language
from J.C. Vereen & Sons v. Houser, 167 So. 45, 47 (Fla. 1936), quoting from Jesse French
Piano & Organ Co. v. Forbes, 29 So. 683 (Ala. 1901): "'"One circumstance always
considered is whether the user is against the interest of the party suffering it, or
injurious to him. There must be an invasion of the party's right, for, unless one loses
something, the other gains nothing." '" 294 So. 2d at 76 (emphasis added by the court).
The Alabama court could have focused on the nature of the use, finding that the use
in itself was insufficient to give notice of an adverse claim. Compare Carrig v. Dee, 80
Mass. (14 Gray) 583, 585 (1860) (swinging window is not a use that encroaches "visibly
or tangibly" on the owner's enjoyment of his property). Instead, the Alabama court
adopted an interpretation of inconsistency that looked only to present enjoyment-the
interpretation endorsed by Tona-Rama.
23. In Downing a public easement was claimed in a road leading to the owner's
house and used primarily by him and his guests. The court regarded such consistency
with the owner's present use of the land as supportive of the presumption of permis-
sion, but nonetheless invited the claimant to amend his pleadings and to introduce proof
of inconsistency. 100 So. 2d at 65-66.
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If inconsistency with present enjoyment had not been regarded as
dispositive of the adversity issue in Tona-Rama, the court could have
reached the same result on other theories,2 4 thus avoiding its restrictive
interpretation of prescription. That interpretation would seem ap-
plicable to all prescriptive easement claims,2 5 making it virtually im-
possible for such claims to succeed.2 6 But whatever the effect of Tona-
Rama on prescriptive easement claims involving property other than
beaches, the court clearly rejected the notion, adopted elsewhere, 27
that long-continued use of beaches by members of the public is ad-
verse per se or creates a presumption of adverse use that the owner
must rebut. Because of Florida's stringent adversity requirement-
24. The court could have held that the evidence offered-provision of municipal
services and testimony by individual members of the public as to their subjective atti-
tudes-was not the clear and substantial proof required to overcome the presumption
of permissive use. See Downing v. Bird, 100 So. 2d 57, 64 (Fla. 1958). Alternatively, the
court could have found that the evidence was insufficient to show the owner's construc-
tive knowledge of the public claim of right; the court could have reasoned that use in-
consistent with the owner's present interests serves a vital notice function. Cf. Annot.,
170 A.L.R. 776, 796 (1947). And even if a prescriptive easement had been found, the
court could have provided solid authority for holding that the observation tower-
which occupied a circle of sand only 17 feet in diameter-was not a significant inter-
ference with public rights. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 481, comment a (1944).
25. Note, however, that after disposing of the prescriptive easement claim the court
prefaced its holding on customary rights with a statement that beaches "require separate
consideration from other lands with respect to the elements and consequences of title."
294 So. 2d at 77.
26. Traditional prescriptive easement cases arise when the owner obstructs a long-
existing use of his property. He dams a ditch, blocks a road or builds a fence because
a previously unobjectionable use-one that has not hindered practical enjoyment of
the property-comes to interfere with present or anticipated practical enjoyment of the
property. See, e.g., Hunt Land Holding Co. v. Schramm, 121 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1960). In Hunt the servient owners, planning to fill and subdivide a mangrove
swamp, blocked a drainage ditch running across the property. In the prescriptive ease-
ment action, the servient owners contended claimants' use had not been adverse be-
cause the ditch drained the owners' land as well as the claimants' and because the
owners were entitled to the presumption of permissive use. Noting that under Downing
a presumption of permissive use is not conclusive, and that exclusivity is not required
for prescription, id. at 700-01, the court held that plaintiffs had presented sufficient
proof to rebut the presumption and had established that "the use was inconsistent
with the rights of the owners to their use and enjoyment of the lands." Id. at 701.
Analyzed in terms of the Tona-Rama rationale, the Hunt decision is erroneous; ditching
a mangrove swamp is not adverse until the owner attempts to put the swamp to
economic uses incompatible with the ditch. See also Annot., 170 A.L.R. 776, 795 (1947),
noting that the Alabama rule on which the Tona-Rama court relied makes it difficult
for a prescriptive easement ever to be established.
27. See, e.g., Elmer v. Rodgers, 214 A.2d 750 (N.H. 1965); State ex rel. Thornton
v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Ore. 1969) (prescriptive easement recognized as alternative basis
for holding); Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)
(prescriptive easement recognized as alternative basis for holding). See generally Degnan,
Public Rights in Ocean Beaches: A Theory of Prescription, 24 SYR. L. REv. 935 (1973).
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and its adoption of the customary rights doctrine 2 8 -it seems that
prescription, like implied dedication, 29 will continue to be ineffectual
for securing public recreational rights in Florida's beaches-less than
five percent of which are publicly owned.30
By recognizing the principle of customary rights, however, the
court adopted a flexible theory for securing public rights. This
venerable English doctrine grants inhabitants of a locality or mem-
bers of certain classes the right to use privately owned land when a
custom of usage has existed "from time immemorial, without interrup-
tion, and as of right; [is] certain as to the place, and as to persons;
and [is] certain and reasonable as to the subject matter or rights
created." 31 In the United States the doctrine was applied in a few nine-
teenth century cases,3 2 but largely lay dormant until the Oregon Su-
preme Court, in State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,33 applied the doctrine
to confirm public rights in dry-sand beach areas. The Oregon court
invoked the customary rights doctrine, instead of prescriptive ease-
ment theory, because it believed that the former doctrine could
eliminate the tract-by-tract litigation characteristic of prescription
cases, and because it regarded the shoreline as sui generis 3 4 The court
might have added that the customary rights approach is likely to en-
sure maximum beach availability to the public; prescriptive ease-
ment and implied dedication decisions spur beach property owners
28. Public activity engaged in as a customary right cannot be adverse since owners
have no legal right to prevent such activity. See Graham v. Walker, 61 A. 98, 99 (Conn.
1905). Florida beach owners thus might find themselves raising customary rights to defeat
a claimed prescriptive easement.
29. Use of implied dedication to find public rights in beaches is illustrated by Gion
iv. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970), and Seaway Co. v. Attorney
General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). The California court held that implied
dedication could be based on adverse use, and use was adverse if the public used the
beach without seeking permission. The owner was held to have the burden of showing
permissive use. See Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV. 564 (1970). Such an
implied dedication approach is not available in Florida, since it has been held that
..mere user by the public, without the consent or objection of the owner, does not
show intention to dedicate." Miller v. Bay-to-Gulf, Inc., 193 So. 425, 427 (Fla. 1940).
See also Commentary, Easements: Judicial and Legislative Protection of the Public's
Rights in Florida's Beaches, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 586, 589-90 (1973); 2 R. BOYER, FLORIDA
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 30.04, at 850 (1973).
30. Of Florida's 6265 miles of shoreline, only 277 miles are publicly owned. Penne-
kamp, Recycling of the Beaches, Miami Herald, Aug. 12, 1974, § A, at 6, col. 6.
31. 3 H. TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 935, at 623 (3d ed. 1939). See generally
Graham v. Walker, 61 A. 98 (Conn. 1905); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 075-*78; J.
BROWNE, LAW OF USAGES AND CUSTOMS §§ 1-33 (1st Amer. ed. 1881); COKE ON LI'LETON,
*110b, *113b, *115a, 0115b, *344a; C. GALE, LAW OF EASEMENTS 3-6 (12th ed.
1950); J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUrITES §§ 572-82 (3d ed. 1915).
32. See, e.g., Knowles v. Dow, 22 N.H. 387 (1851).
33. 462 P.2d 671 (Ore. 1969).
34. Id. at 676.
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to fence out the public, especially in jurisdictions that refuse to re-
gard prohibitory signs as sufficient evidence of an owner's non-
acquiescence in public use. 35
Though there was initial doubt whether Thornton reached all
beaches in the state,36 subsequent cases have confirmed its statewide
applicability.3 7 The Thornton court recognized that general applica-
tion of the customary rights doctrine was inconsistent with English
law, but concluded "it does not follow that a custom, established in
fact, cannot have regional application and be enjoyed by a larger
public than the inhabitants of a single village."3 8'
The supreme court in Tona-Rama provided few guidelines for
application of the customary rights doctrine in Florida.39 The court
simply stated:
If the recreational use of the sandy area adjacent to mean high tide
has been ancient, reasonable, without interruption and free from
dispute, such use, as a matter of custom, should not be interfered
with by the owner. However, the owner may make any use of his
property which is consistent with such public use and not calculated
to interfere with the exercise of the right of the public to enjoy the
dry sand area as a recreational adjunct of the wet sand or foreshore
area.
40
The court noted that exercise of customary rights creates no in-
terest in the land itself, cannot be revoked by the land owner, can be
abandoned by the public and is subject to governmental regulation.41
35. See Comment, This Land Is My Land: The Doctrine of Implied Dedication and
Its Application to California Beaches, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1092, 1094 (1971); Note,
Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REv. 564, 584 n.129 (1970); Commentary, Easements:
Judicial and Legislative Protection of the Public's Rights in Florida's Beaches, 25 U. FLA.
L. Rav. 586, 590 n.36 (1970). See also C. DUNScOMBE, RIPAIUAN AND LITrORAL RIGHTS 62
(1970).
36. See Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV. 564, 584-85 (1970).
37. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Fultz, 491 P.2d 1171 (Ore. 1971).
38. 462 P.2d at 678 n.6. This approach does violence to the English view. Coke
,wrote: "The law of England is divided . . .into three parts; 1. the common law . . .2.
statutes . . . and 3. particular customes . . . . I say particular, for if it be the
generall custome of the realme, it is part of the common law." CoKE ON LIftLETON 0115b.
See also id. at 344a.
39. The matter was not adequately briefed by the parties. The four briefs sub-
mitted to the court totaled 135 pages. Discussion of customary rights occupied less than
two pages in a single brief, the respondent's (claimant's), even though the attorney
general, in the complaint filed before his withdrawal from the Save Sand Key case, had
submitted an elaborate customary rights argument. See Brief for Petitioner, appendix at
26-28, United States Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., No. 44,402 (Fla. June 12, 1974).
40. 294 So. 2d at 78.
41. Id.
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The court did not, however, define the period of use required to raise
customary rights, nor did it clearly indicate the geographic scope of its
decision. Some of the court's language suggests a determination that
a customary right of recreational beach use exists generally in Florida. 2
Yet, in discussing Daytona Beach, the court referred to customary
rights acquired "to use this particular area. ' '4
Tona-Rama seems at least to sanction findings of customary use
in particular localities-an approach clearly consistent with English
practice, 4 4 and one that should curtail most of the tract-by-tract litiga-
tion required under the prescriptive easement or implied dedication
doctrines. Though the parameters of Florida's customary rights doctrine
are unclear, the decision does seem to evince a judicial policy favoring
public use of privately owned dry sand areas. 45 By adopting a theory
long ignored, the court has provided itself with a most flexible doctrine.
It can, if it chooses, follow the Oregon court in recognizing public
recreational rights in all state beaches. Or-if overwhelmed by the
sensitivity to private ownership rights reflected in its adverse possession
42. "We recognize the propriety of protecting the public interest in, and right to
utilization of, the beaches and oceans of the State of Florida. No part of Florida is
more exclusively hers, nor more properly utilized by her people than her beaches." Id.
at 75.
The beaches of Florida are of such character as to use and potential development
as to require separate consideration from other lands with respect to the elements
and consequences of title. The sandy portion of the beaches are [sic] of no use for
farming, grazing, timber production, or residency-the traditional uses of land-
but has served as a thoroughfare and haven for fishermen and bathers, as well
as a place of recreation for the public. The interest and rights of the public to the
full use of the beaches should be protected.
Id. at 77.
Note also that the two decisions cited in support of the customary rights doctrine-
In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Hawaii 1968), and Thornton-affected all state beaches.
Also, a law review commentary cited by the Florida court had recommended adoption
of the customary rights doctrine precisely because the court could provide statewide
public rights in a single decision. See Commentary, Easements: judicial and Legislative
Protection of the Public's Rights in Florida's Beaches, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 586, 590-92
(1973).
43. 294 So. 2d at 78.
44. See note 38 supra; J. BROWNE, supra note 31, §§ 6, 22.
45. See note 42 supra. To the extent that strong language foreshadows strong policy,
the court's language at 294 So. 2d at 78 is auspicious-it was drawn virtually verbatim
from the proposed Open Beaches Act of 1969, H.R. 6656, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 101
(1969), reprinted in Commentary, Easements: Judicial and Legislative Protection of the
Public's Rights in Florida's Beaches, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 586 (1973). The court also might
have been influenced by pro-beach rights policies emerging from the Florida Legislature.
See, e.g., Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-102, § 1, which bars expenditure of public funds for
beach restoration unless provisions are made for public access, parking and use. See also
Pennekamp, Recycling of the Beaches, Miami Herald, Aug. 12, 1974, § A, at 6, col. 6 (in-
dicating the potential impact of the beach restoration law on the Miami Beach area).
['Vol. 2
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and prescriptive easement decisions4 -the court can use the consistency
theory it has espoused in Tona-Rama to severely limit the public's
rights.
As Justice Boyd seemed to fear in his Tona-Rama dissent,47 the
consistency standard may give the court even more latitude in the
area of customary rights than in that of prescriptive easements. But it
is clear already that the customary rights doctrine will give the courts
considerable discretion in balancing the economic rights of taxpaying
property owners against the recreational rights of the public.4 8 As long
as private uses are related to, and do not unreasonably interfere with,
public recreational uses, Tona-Rama suggests private uses will pre-
vail.49
46. The Downing case noted that "[a]cquisition of rights by one in the land of
another, based on possession or use, is not favored in the law and the acquisition of
such rights will be restricted." 100 So. 2d at 65. This judicial disfavor seems to be
increasing. In the adverse possession case of Meyer v. Law, 287 So. 2d 37, 41 (Fla.
1973), the court said: "Today . . . the policy reasons that once supported the idea of
adverse possession may well be succumbing to new priorities." Read together, Tona-
Rama and Meyer suggest that prescription and adverse possession may have been re-
stricted to the point of abolition. Cf. 287 So. 2d at 42 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
47. 294 So. 2d at 79.
48. This discretion may prove to serve a vital role in providing responsible coastal
zone management. Prescription theories freeze the prescribed use until it is abandoned.
See Degnan, supra note 27, at 967. Customary rights decisions may allow the courts
more latitude in cases where land management policies call for utilization of quasi-
public beaches for other than recreational purposes. Such a result could be reached, for
example, through the "reasonable use" requirement of customary rights. See J. BROWNE,
supra note 31, §§ 21-23.
49. In Tona-Rama the tower occupied a circle of sand only 17 feet in diameter.
294 So. 2d at 77. Recreational structures that occupy larger areas-such as the wall of
hotels envisioned by the dissenting opinions, see id. at 79, 81-would require harder
decisions. But it should be noted that the majority opinion twice calls attention to
the inequity of collecting taxes on land that an owner may not use to his economic ad-
vantage. See id. at 75, 77. Justice Boyd's dissenting opinion expresses a similar con-
cern. See id. at 80. In Downing the court held that assessment and collection of taxes
would not necessarily estop municipalities from asserting public rights. 100 So. 2d at
61. But the court's evident sensitivity to the taxation issue may make it a key element
in the balancing of public and private interests.
